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NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT-
DESTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS ON THE
NATIONAL REGISTER
The Ninth Circuit holds that a change in federal funding for a down-
town redevelopment project requires environmental review, but re-
jects a per se rule requiring the preparation of an environmental
impact statement where the destruction of buildings on the National
Register is within the scope of the refinanced project. Preservation
Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1982).
INTRODUCTION
As early as the turn of the century Congress saw the need to legislate
to protect historic properties. Prior to 1966, the types of historic properties
protected by federal legislation were limited primarily to those of "na-
tional significance,"' and those located on federal lands. 2 In the 1960s,
however, public interest in historic preservation gained momentum3 and
Congress passed two acts which greatly expanded the federal role in the
protection of historic properties. 4 Both are important in this discussion.
The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA) has as its
primary goal the protection and preservation of historic properties,' and
provides for the creation and maintenance of a National Register of His-
toric Places.6 Further, the Act provides for the creation of an Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation7 and specifies the duties and obligations
of the Council.' Federal agencies must consult with the Advisory Council
before taking any action that would affect buildings included on or eligible
for listing on the National Register.9 The consultation process may result
in a Memorandum of Agreement which binds the signatories to protective
measures regarding the historic properties.'" If a signatory fails to carry
out the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement, the federal agency must
1. Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§461-67 (1976).
2. Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§431-33 (1976).
3. See generally Stipe, Why Preserve? 11 N.C. CENT. L.J. 211 (1980); Rose, Preservation and
Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1981);
Fowler, Historic Preservation and the Law Today, 12 URB. LAW. 3 (1980).
4. National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-70n (1976); National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§4321-47 (1976).
5. See H.R. Rep. No. 1916, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3307.
6. 16 U.S.C. §470a(a)(1) (1976).
7. Id. at § 470i(a).
8. Id. at §§470j-70k.
9. Id. at § 470f and 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(b) (1982).
10. 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(c) (1982).
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again request the Advisory Council's comments." In those cases, the
federal agency may not take any action that could result in an adverse
effect on property included on or eligible for listing on the National
Register until the Advisory Council has had opportunity to comment. 1
2
Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)
to insure that federal agencies adequately consider environmental factors
before taking action which affects the quality of the human environment,
3
and to insure that the public has opportunity to study and comment upon
proposed agency action. " The Act has as one of its goals the preservation
of "important historic, cultural and natural aspects of our national heri-
tage. .. ."5 Groups seeking to preserve historic properties have often
sought, pursuant to NEPA, judicial review of agency action affecting
those properties.16
The environmental review provisions of NEPA require the preparation
of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 7 Gener-
ally, the federal agency, in order to determine whether the proposed
agency actions will signficantly affect the quality of the human environ-
ment, prepares an Environmental Assessment (EA) of the proposed ac-
tion.' 8 Additionally, in many instances the federal agency may share
responsibility for the preparation of the EA with a state or local agency. ' 9
If the agency preparing the EA makes a finding of no signficant impact
(FONSI), then no EIS is required. 20 If, on the other hand, the agency
determines that the proposed action will have a significant impact, NEPA
requires an EIS.2 Challenges to FONSI's are the subject of much NEPA
litigation and the circuits are split on the standard to apply in reviewing
a FONSI.2z
11. Id. at § 800.6(c)(3).
12. Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. §4331 (1976).
14. Id. at §4331(c).
15. Id. at §4331(b)(4).
16. See e.g., Wisconsin Heritage, Inc. v. Harris, 460 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Wis.), modified 490
F. Supp. 1334 (E.D. Wis. 1980); National Center for Preservation Law v. Landrieu, 496 F. Supp.
716 (D.S.C.); affd per curiam 635 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1980); WATCH v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2nd
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Waterbury Urban Renewal Agency v. WATCH, 444 U.S. 995 (1979);
Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1982).
17. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C) (1976).
18. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(c), 1508.9 (1982).
19. Id. at § 1501.5(b).
20. Id. at §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13.
21. Id. at § 1501.4(c).
22. Compare Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976); Hanley v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d
823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); and First National Bank of Chicago
v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369, 1381 (7th Cir. 1973) (arbitrary and capricious standard of review)
with Portela v. Pierce, 650 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1981); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council
v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 1973); Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz,
498 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1974); and Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th
Cir. 1973) (reasonableness standard of review).
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The historic preservation goals of NHPA and NEPA frequently affect
projects and programs administered by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD). Since HUD is often responsible for admin-
istering financial assistance to urban renewal programs, HUD's actions
often affect buildings in downtown urban areas which are included on or
are eligible for listing on the National Register. Whenever HUD's actions
affect such buildings, the review provisions of NEPA and NHPA apply.
A recent Ninth Circuit opinion, Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, I
concluded that an agreement between a Boise, Idaho, municipal rede-
velopment agency and HUD which converted funding for a downtown
redevelopment project from urban renewal loan and grant funds to Com-
munity Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds required environmental
review pursuant to HUD regulations. The court, however, refused to
apply a per se rule requiring the preparation of an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) whenever agency action results in the destruction of
National Register buildings.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1969 and 1971, HUD and the Boise Redevelopment Agency (BRA)
entered into loan and grant contracts to fund an urban renewal project
covering several blocks in downtown Boise. In 1971 the BRA prepared
an environmental assessment covering both contracts which concluded
that the project would have no significant environmental impact, and that
therefore no EIS was required for the project. HUD approved the BRA's
finding of no significant impact.
Contractors cleared portions of the project site between 1972 and 1978,
but did not undertake any construction during that time. Meanwhile, a
1973 historic preservation survey of downtown Boise, and the project
area, resulted in the listing of seven buildings on the National Register
in 1974. The BRA signed Memoranda of Agreement regarding the build-
ings in 1974. In 1975 the BRA prepared an updated environmental as-
sessment of the project which, like the 1971 environmental assessment,
concluded that the project would have no significant impact. In 1978 the
Eastman Building was added to the National Register, and in 1979 the
BRA signed a Memorandum of Agreement regarding that building. 24
In 1979, the BRA converted funding for the redevelopment project
from urban renewal loan and grant funds to Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) funds by entering into a "financial settlement" with
HUD.' The financial settlement allowed the BRA to pay off existing
23. 667 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1982).
24. The court did not decide whether the defendants had violated NHPA, and did not discuss the
terms of the Memorandum of Agreement.
25. The CDBG program was an effort by the federal goverrnnet to consolidate "complex and
overlapping programs of financial assistance to communities of varying sizes and needs into a
consistent system of federal aid..." 24 C.F.R. 570.2(b) (1980).
January 1984]
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project loans, and to apply the remainder of the CDBG funds to the
completion of the project. Further, and more importantly, the funding
conversion allowed the BRA to apply CDBG funds toward construction
of a 3000 space parking garage. The BRA could not have used urban
renewal loan and grant funds for that purpose.
The BRA, pursuant to HUD regulations governing financial settle-
ments, prepared and submitted to HUD an environmental assessment
(EA) of the entire project, including the parking garage. The EA addressed
the effects the redevelopment project would have on the historic envi-
ronment, the air quality, the noise level, and traffic congestion in Boise
and concluded that the project would have no significant impacts. HUD
approved the EA and Preservation Coalition, Inc. (Coalition) brought suit
challenging HUD's approval. The Coalition's central contention was that
the destruction of buildings on the National Register per se significantly
affects the quality of the human environment and that therefore the BRA
was required to prepare an EIS.
The district court found that the doctrine of laches barred the Coalition's
claims against the BRA. Alternatively, the court concluded that the BRA's
clearance finding or FONSI was reasonable, and that, therefore, the BRA
was not required to prepare an EIS of the redevelopment project. Further,
the district court concluded that the BRA's decision to demolish or sub-
stantially alter buildings on the National Register did not violate NHPA.
The Coalition appealed the NEPA findings only. The National Trust for
Historic Preservation (National Trust) filed an amicus brief which chal-
lenged the NHPA findings.
THE DECISION
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first held that the doctrine of laches
did not bar the Coalition's claims against the BRA. 6 The court then
concluded that the conversion of funding for the project from urban
renewal loan and grant funds to CDBG funds required environmental
review pursuant to HUD regulations.27 The court, although it concluded
that the funding conversion required environmental review, held that the
BRA's EA and FONSI were reasonable and that therefore the BRA was
not required to prepare an EIS.28 Further, the court held that the NHPA
claims were not properly before the court, and did not address those
claims.29
26. 667 F.2d at 855.
27. Id. at 856.
28. Id. at 858-61.
29. Id. at 862.
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Doctrine of Laches
The court of appeals held that the application of the doctrine of laches
is discretionary, but that the district court had not properly applied the
doctrine. The court of appeals stated the district court could not apply
the doctrine unless it "properly found (a) lack of diligence by the party
against whom the defense is asserted, and (b) prejudice to the party
asserting the defense." 3 The district court determined that June 28, 1971,
the date the BRA and HUD entered into the second loan and grant contract,
was the relevant date for determining whether the Coalition had been
diligent. Since the Coalition did not file suit until 1979, the district court
reasoned that the Coalition had not been diligent. The court of appeals
rejected that analysis.
The court of appeals concluded that May 1979, the date the BRA
decided to destroy National Register buildings, was the relevant date.
The court concluded that since the Coalition, upon learning of the BRA's
decision, had promptly complained to HUD that an EIS was required,
and had filed suit immediately after HUD announced that no EIS was
required, the Coalition had been diligent. Further, the court determined
that the BRA would not be prejudiced by the maintenance of the suit
since no project construction had taken place. The court of appeals held
that the Coalition's claims were not barred by the doctrine of laches.
Environmental Review of the Funding Conversion
The Coalition argued that HUD's approval of the funding conversion
was tantamount to HUD's authorizing the construction of a 3000 car
parking facility. It argued that since CDBG funds would be used to
construct the facility, whereas urban renewal funds could not have been
used for that purpose, the funding conversion itself caused all the envi-
ronmental impacts associated with the construction of a major parking
facility. The Coalition argued that HUD's "authorization" of the parking
structure was a "major federal action significantly affecting the human
environment" and that the BRA was therefore required to prepare an EIS.
The court of appeals rejected the Coalition's contentions. The court
determined that the parking structure, although not funded by the previous
loan and grant contract, was a part of the original redevelopment plan.
Under that plan the BRA committed itself to raise funds for the parking
structure to satisfy state matching requirements. The court reasoned that
the funding conversion did no more than finance that which the BRA
considered necessary for the completion of the project. The court therefore
determined that the BRA's 1971 and 1975 EA findings of no significant
impact were still valid. The court did not, however, discuss whether the
30. Id. at 854.
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previous EA's had addressed the impact that the parking structure would
have on downtown Boise.
The court compared the facts in this case to those in San Francisco
Tomorrow v. Romney."' There the Ninth Circuit held that a grant of
additional funds to cover increased land acquisition and relocation costs
was not "further major federal action" within the meaning of NEPA and
that, therefore, no further environmental review was required. The Pres-
ervation court likened the funding conversion to the grant of additional
funds in San Francisco Tomorrow. The court stated "... the shift from
urban renewal funds to CDBG funds does not affect the fundamental
nature of the project, nor inject into it a new aspect which has never been
considered"32 [emphasis supplied]. As noted supra, however, the court
did not discuss whether the EA's prepared in 1971 and 1975 had addressed
the parking structure.
The Preservation court, although it determined that the funding con-
version was not tantamount to HUD's authorizing construction of a pre-
viously unconsidered parking garage, and hence did not require
environmental review for that reason, concluded that the funding con-
version did require environmental review under then-applicable HUD
regulations. The then-applicable HUD regulations provided that where
"previously conducted environmental reviews are insufficient due to changed
circumstances, including the availability of additional data or advances
in technology, [the project] must be subjected to an original or updated
environmental review. ... " Further, the regulations provided that where
an applicant proposed a financial settlement of an urban renewal project
prior to substantial completion, the proposal was deemed a "project"
subject to environmental review.34
The court found that because the Eastman Building had been added to
the National Register subsequent to the preparation of the 1971 and 1975
environmental assessments, conditions had changed and an updated en-
vironmental review was required. The court also found that BRA was
required to prepare an environmental assessment of the financial settle-
ment. The BRA did in fact prepare an environmental assessment in 1979
which took into account changed circumstances, including the addition
of buildings in the project area to the National Register, and the impact
of the financial settlement. The BRA made a "clearance finding" of no
significant impacts, and HUD approved the finding.
31. 472 F.2d 1021 (9th Cir. 1973).
32. 667 F.2d at 856.
33. 24 C.F.R. §58.19(a) (1979).
34. Id. at § 58.20.
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Standard of Review-Rejection of a Per Se Rule
The court of appeals reviewed the BRA's clearance finding and, ap-
plying a "reasonableness" standard of review, upheld the BRA's deter-
mination of no significant impact. The Coalition's principal contention
was that the BRA's finding of no significant impact was per se unrea-
sonable since the BRA contemplated, as part of the project, the destruction
of a National Register building. The court of appeals recognized that the
Second Circuit has apparently adopted a per se rule requiring the prep-
aration of an EIS whenever National Register buildings are affected by
a project,35 but refused to apply such a rule. The court stated that such
a rule is "inconsistent with at least the spirit of San Francisco Tomorrow
v. Romney. "36
The court further reasoned that a per se rule was unreasonable because
it would place too much of a burden on agencies. The court determined
that the environmental assessment is a necessary and desirable screening
device which relieves agencies of the responsibility of preparing unnec-
essary and expensive environmental impact statements. The court con-
cluded that a per se rule would unnecessarily remove the environmental
assessment screen since it would require the preparation of an EIS.
The court, although it rejected a per se rule, required that the BRA's
finding of no significant impact be "reasonable." At the outset of its
analysis the court stated that ". . . judgments of historical significance
made by the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation ... deserve great
weight." 37 The court further stated, however, that ". . . compliance with
NHPA, even when it exists, does not assure compliance with NEPA." 38
The court did not discuss whether the BRA had complied with NHPA,
nor did it discuss whether the BRA had complied with the terms of the
Memorada of Agreement regarding the protected buildings.
The BRA concluded that the project would not significantly affect the
historic environment in downtown Boise. The BRA relied primarily upon
a report prepared by an architect which concluded that other buildings in
the downtown area better represent the architecturally significant features
of the building scheduled for demolition. The court stated, "[o]n balance,
the careful manner in which the BRA considered historic information and
the thoroughness of its statement explaining its decision not to require
35. WATCH v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Waterbury Urban Renewal
Agency v. WATCH, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
36. 667 F.2d at 857; see supra, text accompanying notes 28 and 29.
37. 667 F.2d at 858.
38. Id. at 859.
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an EIS convinces us that the BRA's finding of no significant impact on
the historic environment was reasonable."
39
The court criticized BRA's methodology in determining that the project
would have no significant impacts on air quality but nevertheless upheld
the determination. The BRA proposed mitigation measures to reduce the
impact of the project on the air quality and produce an overall result of
no significant impact. The court found that BRA's reliance on mitigation
measures proposed to be taken by public and private bodies not controlled
by the BRA or City of Boise was "improper." The court, however, found
that the record adequately described mitigation measures which were
under the control of the BRA and the City of Boise, and hence concluded
that the finding of no significant impact on the air quality was reasonable.
The court also upheld the BRA's determination that the project would
not have significant impacts on noise level or traffic congestion. The court
noted that where a federal project conforms to local zoning ordinances
and land use plans, such conformity is evidence supporting a finding of
no significant impact. The court determined that the urban renewal project
did not change land use patterns. The primary effect of the project was
to "reverse and mitigate existing adverse environmental trends and con-
ditions by replacing an obsolete and deteriorating retail commercial area
with a new one." 4" The court concluded that the finding of no significant
impacts on noise level and traffic congestion was reasonable.
NHPA Claims
The court refused to consider the NHPA claims asserted by the amicus
National Trust. The Coalition, although it did assert NHPA claims in
district court, chose not to do so on appeal. The court held that the amicus
could not, itself, place the issue before the court on appeal since the
amicus was not a party below. The court suggested that the amicus should
have intervened instead of appearing as amicus.
ANALYSIS
The Preservation court asserted that the funding conversion, although
it allowed the BRA to spend federal money on a parking garage, did not
"affect the fundamental nature of the project, nor inject into it a new
aspect which ha[d] never been considered."" Therefore, the court con-
cluded, the funding conversion was not the equivalent of HUD's au-
thorizing construction of a previously unconsidered parking garage. The
39. Id. at 859-60.
40. Id. at 861 (citing, Central Oklahoma Preservation Alliance v. Oklahoma City, 471 F.Supp.
68, 78 (W.D. Okl. 1979)).
41. 667 F.2d at 856.
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court conspicuously, however, made no mention of whether the impacts
of the parking garage had, in the 1971 and 1975 EA's, been considered
and discussed.
In this case, the BRA addressed the environmental impacts of the
parking garage in the 1979 EA, because then-applicable HUD regulations
required it to do so. Under 24 C.F.R. §58.19 the BRA was required to
prepare updated environmental review of the entire project because the
EA's which it prepared in 1971 and 1975 were "insufficient due to changed
circumstances." 42 Those "changed circumstances" were the addition of
the Eastman Building to the National Register in 1979. Further, 24 C.F.R.
§ 58.20 required the BRA to prepare an "assessment of the environmental
consequences of the financial settlement" itself.43
Current 24 C.F.R. § 58.20, like its predecessor, requires an applicant
for a financial settlement to prepare an assessment of the environmental
consequences of the financial settlement." Current 24 C.F.R. § 58.19,
however, has been substantially revised. Now the regulation does not
require updated environmental review of ongoing projects unless no en-
vironmental review has previously been completed, or a prior EIS is
insufficient under regulations governing the use of prior EIS's.45 The
regulation does not specifically require updated environmental review if
a clearance finding of no signficant impacts has been approved, even if
there are changed circumstances (e.g., addition of buildings in the project
area to the National Register).46
The Preservation court determined that the financial settlement, al-
though it allowed the BRA to spend federal money on a parking garage,
did not for that reason trigger NEPA environmental review requirements.
The court reasoned that only 24 C.F.R. §58.19 required the BRA to
prepare an EA of the entire project. If, however, current 24 C.F.R. § 58.19
had been in effect, the BRA would not have been required, because of
the addition of buildings in the project area to the National Register, to
prepare updated environmental review of the entire project.47 Hence, the
42. 24 C.F.R. §58.19(a) (1979).
43. Id. at §58.20(a)(2).
44. 24 C.F.R. § 58.20(a)(2) (1982).
45. Id. at §58.19(c)(2).
46. The Preservation court concluded, without discussing the language of current § 58.19, that
"it appears that under the new regulations supplementary review would still be required [where
circumstances have changes significantly]." The court further concluded, "[i]f the regulations do
not demand such supplementation, the statute itself [NEPA] probably requires it." The court noted,
however, "[s]upplementation of an environmental assessment after designation of historic buildings
in the project area to the National Register would not, of course, be required where applicable
environmental review has been previously carried out in a timely and proper manner." [citation
obmitted] 667 F.2d at 851 n.1. The court did not, however, discuss whether in this case the EA's
prepared in 1971 and 1975 had adequately addressed the impacts of the parking garage. See supra,
text accompanying notes 28 and 29.
47. See supra, note 45.
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impacts of the parking garage would not have been spcifically considered
and addressed in 1979.
The reasoning in Preservation suggests a loophole through which local
agencies might avoid NEPA obligations. Where a change in funding
allows a local agency to spend money for purposes not originally au-
thorized, the agency could claim that the later purposes are within the
original "planned scope of the project," that an EA was previously ap-
proved for the project, and that therefore, it is not required to prepare
updated environmental review. Under current 24 C.RR. §58.19 the agency
would not specifically be required to prepare an updated environmental
review if an EA clearance finding (FONSI) had previously been approved.
Under current 24 C.F.R. §58.20 the agency would have to assess the
environmental consequences of the financial settlement, but not of any
aspects of the project within the original "planned scope of the project."
The Preservation court rejected a per se rule requiring the preparation
of an environmental impact statement where the destruction of buildings
on the National Register is contemplated. The court instead held that an
environmental assessment must consider the effects of a project on the
historic environment, and that if through the assessment process the agency
concludes that the project has no significant affects, the court must de-
termine whether the finding is "reasonable." The court, after reviewing
all of the evidence before the lower court, concluded that the BRA's
finding was "reasonable" and upheld the BRA's decision not to prepare
an EIS.48
In jurisdictions where a court applies a "reasonableness" standard in
reviewing an agency's decision not to prepare an EIS, a per se rule
requiring the preparation of an EIS is unnecessarily burdensome. The
court, in applying the reasonableness standard, must have a fully devel-
oped administrative record before it, and may consider "supplemental
affidavits, depositions, and other proof considering the environmental
impact of the project ... if an inadequate evidentiary development before
the agency can be shown." 49 A reasonableness standard of review should
insure that an agency FONSI which does not adequately address the
impact on the historic environment of the destruction of a building on
the National Register will be overturned by the reviewing court.
If, on the other hand, a reviewing court applies an "arbitrary and
capricious" standard in reviewing agency decisions, as does the Second
Circuit, a per se rule may be justifiable. An agency decision not to prepare
an EIS where the destruction of buildings listed on the National Register
is contemplated may be unreasonable under a reasonableness standard of
48. 667 F.2d at 857-61.
49. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 1973).
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review but acceptable under an arbitrary and capricious standard. A court
applying an arbitrary and capricious standard would be compelled to
uphold an agency FONSI unless that finding was clearly arbitrary. "Absent
a showing of arbitrary action, [a court] must assume that the agenc[y]
[has] exercised [its] discretion appropriately." 5" If a court can overturn a
FONSI only if it is arbitrary and capricious, a per se rule may be the
only way to insure that effects on the historic environment be given
adequate consideration.
CONCLUSION
The reasoning in Preservation leaves open a loophole through which
local agencies might try to "bootstrap" projects onto previously funded
projects without having to comply with NEPA. Courts reviewing federal
action involving funding changes for NEPA compliance should carefully
scrutinize claims by local agencies that proposed construction is within
the scope of a previously developed plan. Where proposed construction
has not been specifically considered in a previous environmental assess-
ment or EIS, the reviewing court should require that an assessment be
performed which does address the proposed construction. Careful review
by the courts will insure that agencies comply with the environmental
review provisions of NEPA.
Where the destruction of buildings listed on the National Register will
result from proposed federal agency action, environmental review is al-
ways required by NEPA. Whether the agency should per se be required
to prepare an EIS in those cases may logically depend on which standard
of review the court applies in reviewing a FONSI. If the court applies
an arbitrary and capricious standard of review, a per se rule requiring the
preparation of an EIS may be justifiable since the court will only reverse
a FONSI if the agency which prepared the EA was clearly acting arbitrarily
in reaching the FONSI. If, on the otherhand, the court applies a reason-
ableness standard of review, as in Preservation, a per se rule is probably
not justifiable. In those cases, the court should reverse any unreasonable
FONSI. Whichever standard of review a court applies, it should bear in
mind that the purpose of environmental review of federal agency action
affecting National Register properties is to insure that any proposed de-
struction of architecturally, culturally, or historically significant buildings
be carefully considered.
JACK N. HARDWICK
50. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976).
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